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Abstract
We present a privacy system that leverages differential privacy to protect LinkedIn members’
data while also providing audience engagement insights to enable marketing analytics related
applications. We detail the differentially private algorithms and other privacy safeguards used
to provide results that can be used with existing real-time data analytics platforms, specifically
with the open sourced Pinot system. Our privacy system provides user-level privacy guarantees.
As part of our privacy system, we include a budget management service that enforces a strict
differential privacy budget on the returned results to the analyst. This budget management
service brings together the latest research in differential privacy into a product to maintain
utility given a fixed differential privacy budget.
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1 Introduction
LinkedIn’s Audience Engagement API is a platform that enables marketers (analysts) aggregated
insights about members’ content engagements while ensuring member (user) data is protected.
Consider an advertiser that is selling a cloud solution and wants to create a sponsored post on
LinkedIn. The advertiser might use the Audience Engagement API to do research and find that
the target audience engages with GDPR articles. Hence, the advertiser should write about how
their cloud solution adheres to GDPR standards, thus increasing engagement. By design, the
Audience Engagement API is secure, aggregated, and uses state of the art differentially private
algorithms to provide rigorous privacy guarantees. In order to incorporate differential privacy, we
carefully balance various resources, including data storage distributed across several servers, real-
time query computation, privacy loss quantified by the differential privacy parameters (ε, δ), and
accuracy. We describe here the overall privacy system deployed at LinkedIn that balances these
resources to provide a product that surfaces audience engagement insights while putting members
first by safeguarding their data.
Providing scalable, real-time analytics with low latency without differential privacy is challeng-
ing enough. Luckily, we have the open source real-time distributed OLAP datastore, called Apache
Pinot (incubating) [11]. Pinot enables use cases like Job and Publisher Analytics and Who Viewed
My Profile. In order to develop a differentially private system, we need to think how it can be used
in conjunction with a (distributed) OLAP system such as Pinot. This would enable us to have
scalable privacy systems. Furthermore, we need to implement a budgeting tool into the API so
that analysts cannot repeatedly query the dataset thus making noise addition pointless. Our goal
is twofold: implement differentially private algorithms that can be used with real-time distributed
OLAP systems and incorporate a privacy budget management service to restrict the amount of
information an analyst can retrieve. For the privacy budget management service, we incorporate
the latest composition bounds for our particular algorithms [4] to extract more utility subject to a
given differential privacy budget.
1.1 Contributions
We make several contributions toward making practical privacy systems that leverage differential
privacy.
• We provide a suite of differentially private algorithms that cover the data analytics tasks for
LinkedIn’s Audience Engagement API, which provide user-level privacy guarantees
• We detail our privacy budget management service that is able to track each analyst’s privacy
budget over multiple data centers. Hence, we can ensure the budget is enforced across large
scale systems in real-time.
• We showcase empirical results of our algorithms on LinkedIn’s data for various privacy pa-
rameters on our deployed system.
1.2 Related Work
Differential privacy has become the standard privacy benchmark for data analytics on sensitive
datasets. Despite its popularity in the academic literature, the number of actually implemented
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differential privacy systems is limited, but growing. Several of the currently implemented systems
with differential privacy are in the local model, where data is individually privatized prior to being
aggregated on a central server. The main local differentially private systems include Google’s
RAPPOR on their Chrome browser [8], Apple’s iOS and MacOS diagnostics [1], and Microsoft’s
telemetry data in Windows 10 Fall Creators Update [3].
The privacy model we are interested in for this work is the global privacy setting, where data
is already stored centrally, but we want to ensure each result computed on the data is privatized.
In this less restrictive privacy setting, the main industrial differential privacy systems include Mi-
crosoft’s PINQ [17], Uber’s FLEX for its internal analytics [12], LinkedIn’s PriPeARL for its ad
analytics [16], and the 2020 U.S. Census [2]. In this work, we present a privacy system that in-
corporates a privacy budget management service to ensure user-level privacy, whereas LinkedIn’s
PriPeARL system provides event-level privacy and was focused on providing consistent results,
which we also incorporate. The FLEX system points out that a privacy budget management ser-
vice can be implemented but does not provide a strategy for how to do it. Our service takes into
account the various privacy algorithms to take advantage of the latest privacy composition bounds,
such as pay-what-you-get composition [5, 4]. Further, our system is part of an API that allows
for adaptively chosen queries computed in real-time, which is, to our knowledge, a different model
from the future U.S. Census Bureau’s system. There are also open source libraries for differen-
tially private algorithms, such as [10] and the upcoming collaboration project between Harvard
and Microsoft [14]. Another related privacy system is PSI (Ψ) from the Harvard Privacy Tools
Project [9]. PSI is a private data sharing interface to “enable researchers in the social sciences and
other fields to share and explore privacy-sensitive datasets with the strong privacy protections of
differential privacy.” Although they support several commonly used statistics, our system covers
the necessary algorithms to privatize queries in the Audience Engagement API. Further, our system
allows for handling highly distributed datasets via Pinot and still enforce a strict privacy budget
that is eventually consistent across data centers.
2 Preliminaries
We now present some notation and fundamental definitions that will be used to describe our privacy
system. We will denote the data histogram as h ∈ Nd where d is the dimension of the data universe,
which might be unknown or known. We say that h and h′ are neighbors, sometimes denoted as
h ∼ h′, if they differ in the presence or absence of at most one member’s data. We now define
differential privacy [7, 6].
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy). An algorithm M that takes a histogram in Nd to some
arbitrary outcome set Y is (ε, δ)-differentially private (DP) if for all neighbors h,h′ and for all
outcome sets S ⊆ Y, we have Pr[M(h) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr[M(h′) ∈ S] + δ. If δ = 0, then we simply write
ε-DP.
In our algorithms, we will add noise to the histogram counts. The noise distributions we consider
are from a Gumbel distribution where Gumbel(b) has PDF pGumbel(z; b) or a Laplace distribution
where Lap(b) has PDF pLap(z; b), and
pGumbel(z; b) =
1
b
· e−(z/b+e−z/b) and pLap(z; b) = 1
2b
· e−|z|/b. (1)
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As an analyst interacts with private algorithms, the resulting privacy parameters increase with
each returned result. Hence, we need to account for the overall privacy budget that an analyst can
exhaust before the privacy loss is deemed to be too large. We then use the composition property
of DP to bound the resulting privacy parameters. We will use bounded range in our composition
analysis, which was introduced by Durfee and Rogers [5]. Note that ε-BR implies ε-DP and ε-DP
implies 2ε-BR.
Definition 2.2 (Bounded Range). Given a mechanismM that takes a histogram in Nd to outcome
set Y, we say that M is ε-bounded range (BR) if for any y1, y2 ∈ Y and any neighboring databases
h,h′ we have
Pr[M(h) = y1]
Pr[M(h′) = y1] ≤ e
ε Pr[M(h) = y2]
Pr[M(h′) = y2]
where we use the density function instead for continuous outcomes.
We now state the result from Dong et al. [4] that tightens the composition bound from Durfee
and Rogers [5] which itself improved on the more general optimal DP composition bounds [15, 19].
Lemma 2.1. Let M1,M2, · · · ,Mt each be ε-BR where the choice of mechanism Mi at round i
may depend on the previous outcomes of M1, · · · ,Mi−1, then the resulting composed algorithm is
(ε′(δ), δ)-DP for any δ ≥ 0 where ε′(δ) is the minimum of tε and
t
(
ε
1− e−ε − 1− ln
(
ε
1− e−ε
))
+ ε
√
t
2
ln(1/δ). (2)
We also can use the more complicated composition bound for BR mechanisms [4]. However
we cannot use the optimal composition bound from [4] because it only applies to the non-adaptive
setting. Here we are interested in the API setting which allows the user to ask adaptive queries.
3 Private Data Analytics
To incorporate differential privacy, we needed to consider the various tasks we want the application
to handle. We will be focusing on data analytics based on histograms or counts over different
domain elements. We will discuss each query type our privacy system handles, but first we need to
set up some notation.
In order to provide a user-level privacy guarantee where all data records of a user are protected,
as opposed to event-level where only an individual data record is protected, we consider two types
of queries. The first consists of distinct count queries where a member can contribute a count of
at most 1 to any number of elements, i.e. ||h− h′||∞ ≤ 1 for any neighbors h,h′ (`∞-sensitivity).
An example of such a query would be “what are the top-k articles that are shared among distinct
members with a certain skill set?” The second type is non-distinct count queries where a member
can increase the count of any element by amount τ ≥ 1, i.e. ||h−h′||∞ ≤ τ for any neighbors h,h′.
Note that τ = 1 gives us the distinct count setting and τ can be a parameter for each non-distinct
count query.
In either case, distinct count or non-distinct count queries, a member can either affect the
count of an arbitrary number of elements ||h−h′||0 ≤ d for any neighbors h,h′ ∈ Nd or a bounded
number ||h− h′||0 ≤ ∆ for ∆ < d (`0-sensitivity). We separate these two cases as the unrestricted
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sensitivity and ∆-restricted sensitivity settings, respectively. In the case of unrestricted sensitivity,
we will return only a fixed number of counts, say the top-k, in order to bound the privacy loss.
Scaling our privacy system across several analysts with queries that require data from multiple
servers requires algorithms that can run efficiently with runtime that does not scale with the entire
data domain size d. For example, for the top-10 articles engaged with by staff software engineers,
we do not want to query over all articles, since there could potentially be billions of articles and
would be computationally expensive and slow. For this reason, we distinguish the case where the
data domain is reasonably sized and known, i.e. known domain, from when the data domain is
very large or unknown, i.e. unknown domain.
We then summarize in Table 1 the set of queries that we want our privacy system to handle into
unrestricted sensitivity or ∆-restricted sensitivity as well as known domain or unknown domain with
the corresponding algorithms we will use for each setting. Recall that we can interpolate between
distinct count queries and non-distinct count queries with the τ ≥ 1 parameter, so we include τ
as a parameter to each of our algorithms. Furthermore, each algorithm takes a privacy parameter
εper.
∆-restricted sensitivity unrestricted sensitivity
Known
Domain KnownLap∆,τ [7] KnownGumbk,τ [18]
Unknown
Domain UnkLap∆,d¯,τ UnkGumbk,d¯,τ
Table 1: DP algorithms for various data analytics tasks
Restricting the `∞-sensitivity is not part of the algorithm, rather it is done by using distinct
count queries (τ = 1), knowing a bound a priori, or done via a preprocessing step on the data.
For the unknown domain setting, we require a parameter d¯ which tells us how many elements from
the original dataset that we can access in our algorithms. We think of d¯ as the maximum number
of elements our OLAP system can return without causing significant latency. For the unrestricted
sensitivity setting, we require our algorithms to return at most k elements, such as the top-k. This
is due to the fact that a user can change the counts of an arbitrary number of elements. In such
cases, to have any hope to bound the privacy loss, we bound the number of elements that can
be returned. In Table 1, we refer to the following mechanisms: the standard Laplace mechanism
from [7] is denoted as KnownLap∆,τ , which adds Laplace noise with scale proportional to τ/εper
to each count; the k-peeling exponential mechanism [18], which adds Gumbel noise with scale
proportional to τ/εper to each count and returns the elements with the top-k noisy counts, which
we denote as KnownGumbk,τ ; the generalized restricted sensitivity algorithm from [5] denoted as
UnkLap∆,d¯,τ , which is presented in Algorithm 3; the generalized unrestricted sensitivity algorithm
from [5] denoted as UnkGumbk,d¯,τ , which is presented in Algorithm 4.
The primary difference between querying the OLAP datastore for results with privacy as op-
posed to without privacy is that when querying for the top-k in the unknown domain setting, we
instead fetch the top-d¯ and then use UnkGumbk,d¯,τ or UnkLap∆,d¯,τ . Ideally, we would want to set
d¯ = d to get the full dataset, but that is not practical when the number of elements is large and the
existing architecture potentially trims the results for efficiency. The choice of algorithm for each
query can be a simple look up of the group by clause where if no additional information is given,
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then we default to the unknown domain and unrestricted sensitivity.
4 Privacy System Architecture
Existing OLAP datastores are designed to provide real-time data analytics over distributed datasets,
with differential privacy not necessarily being incorporated from the beginning. Pinot is the an-
alytics platform of choice at LinkedIn for site-facing use cases. In this section, we detail how we
incorporated differential privacy with Pinot and the application. Figure 1 presents the overall
system.
Data Center 1
Analyst 1
Application
DP Library
Budget 
Management 
Service
Pinot
Budget 
Manager 
Data Store
Data Center 2
Analyst 4
Application
DP Library
Budget 
Management 
Service
Pinot
Budget 
Manager 
Data Store
Analyst 2 Analyst 3
Figure 1: The overall privacy system with additional components for DP being the DP Library as
well as the Budget Management Service and Data Store. The arrows between Analysts and Data
Centers show that an analyst may be initially assigned one data center (bold) but can migrate to
a different one (dashed).
The application entity, based on the request received from the analyst, generates queries to
the underlying database. The queries typically ask for a histogram grouped by some column. In
order to apply the right algorithm for the query, the application needs to know the sensitivity and
domain setting of the column as shown in Table 1. Also, the query is to be modified to fetch a
potentially larger number of rows from the database.
We designed generic interfaces that are implemented by a suite of algorithms. The interfaces
allow the application to:
• Retrieve modified query parameters (e.g. changing k to d¯).
• Estimate the privacy cost of the query (e.g. return ∆ or k).
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• Add noise to results based on privacy parameters configured.
• Compute the actual cost of the query, e.g. the number of items returned in the unrestricted
sensitivity setting.
The application can independently invoke budget management functions, such as the following:
• Getting the available budget for an analyst to verify whether a query can even start to execute.
• Depleting the available budget once the query has executed.
The cost of a query could be multi-dimensional, including the cost of a making the call and of
information retrieved (see Section 6).
Given the query from the analyst and the selected DP algorithm, the application will then
interact with the DP library. It will first determine the expected cost of the resulting query to
show the application, which is a function of the query that is asked and the selected algorithm.
The application then calls the DP library to translate the query to a DP version that will be used
to query Pinot. For example, if the query is for top-k and the algorithm is in the unknown domain
setting, then the translation could simply be to modify k to 2k, in which case d¯ = 2k in UnkLap∆,d¯,τ
and UnkGumbk,d¯,τ . On the other hand, if the query is over the known domain setting, then we will
want to translate k to d in order to get counts over the full domain, including elements with zero
counts.
Now that when the application has the modified query from the DP library, we need to check
whether there is enough budget remaining from the budget management service for the query to
be evaluated, which are updated parameters (k?, `?) that decrease from some fixed values. We
typically call the k? parameter the information budget and can be thought of as the amount of
the ε parameter in DP we are consuming. Additionally, we refer to `? as the call budget and is
associated with the δ parameter in DP. We assume that each analyst will have its own budget
and each analyst starts with the same budget. If the budget is exhausted for an analyst then the
budget management service does not allow the query to be executed and tells the application that
the analyst has exhausted their entire budget. If the budget is not depleted, yet what remains is
less than the expected cost of the query, then we still do not evaluate the query.
Once the budget management service allows for the query to be evaluated, the application
queries Pinot as it would have without the privacy system only now with the translated query. The
Pinot result is then returned to the application and then the application makes another call to the
DP library with the Pinot result. The DP library will then run the corresponding DP algorithm
on the Pinot result and return the DP result. Based on the DP result, the budget management
service updates the parameters k?, `?, as described in Algorithm 5, and returns the result to the
application.
We built the algorithms module and the budget management module to be independent of each
other for the following reasons:
• While DP algorithms are running on the application layer, budget management operations
require a remote call to a distributed system because the budget management service needs
to provide a consistent view to all application instances. Therefore, keeping the budget man-
agement independent of algorithms will allow us to scale them independently. The algorithms
will need to scale to minimize memory and CPU usage, whereas the budget management ser-
vice will need to scale in terms of handling higher query-per-second (QPS), while minimizing
latency.
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• We require that newer (as yet unknown) algorithms still be able to use and manage budgets.
• Multiple implementations of the budget manager are possible depending on system require-
ments. We need to be able to iterate on these independently and quickly.
• The algorithms need not (and do not) know about the analyst that is querying, and the
budget manager does not behave differently depending on the type of query or algorithms
used. As long as they both have a common notion of the units (k?, `?) and dimensions of
cost, it makes sense to keep these independent of each other.
4.1 Pinot: a distributed OLAP datastore
Pinot [11] is a distributed, real-time, columnar OLAP data store, currently incubating in Apache.
At LinkedIn, we have two main categories of analytics applications: internal applications (such as
dashboards, anomaly detection platform, A/B testing, etc.) and site-facing applications (such as
Who viewed my profile, Talent Insights, etc.). Internal dashboards need to process a large volume
of data (trillions of records), but can tolerate latencies in hundreds of milliseconds. They also have
a relatively low query volume. The site-facing applications, on the other hand, serve hundreds of
millions of LinkedIn members, and therefore have a very high query volume with a latency budget
of a few to perhaps tens of milliseconds.
Pinot has a flexible architecture and supports a wide variety of applications in the spectrum.
Pinot production clusters at LinkedIn are serving tens of thousands queries per second, support-
ing more than 50 analytical use cases, and ingesting over millions of records per second. Other
companies such as Uber, Microsoft, and Weibo are also operating production Pinot clusters.
Broker
BrokerRealtime
Servers
BrokerOffline 
Servers
Controller
Segment
Store
Zookeeper
(Metadata)
(REST) Queries Offline
Data Push (Rest) Admin
Realtime
Stream
Figure 2: Overall Pinot Architecture.
As shown in Figure 2, Pinot has three different components: controller, broker, and server.
Controllers handle cluster wide coordination, run periodic tasks for cluster state validation and
retention management, and provide a REST API for managing cluster metadata. Brokers receive
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queries and federate them to servers so as to cover all the segments (shards) of a table. Servers
execute the query on the segments. Offline servers host segments that are batch ingested while
real-time servers host the segments that are ingested from streaming sources, such as Kafka [13].
For the privacy system at LinkedIn, we naturally decided to use Pinot as an OLAP data
store because Pinot already supported a lot of customer-facing analytics applications like Audience
Engagement. However, it is noteworthy that our architecture keeps the the budget management
service and Pinot as separate components so that we can easily provide DP features to other
analytical query engines such as Presto and Spark SQL.
5 Differentially Private Algorithms
We detail the algorithms for the various tasks in Table 1. These algorithms consist of previous work
from [7], [18], and [5], or slightly modified forms. Each algorithm takes a εper privacy parameter,
which determines the amount of noise to add, while each algorithm in the unknown domain setting
has an additional δ > 0 privacy parameter. We point out that UnkGumbk,d¯,τ is the default algorithm
to use when no other information is known. However, the benefit of knowing the domain is that
when k results are requested, k results will be returned each time, whereas the unknown domain
setting may return fewer than k. The benefit of the ∆-restricted sensitivity setting is that the budget
depletes by only ∆, rather than by the number of elements returned, from as in the unrestricted
setting.
5.1 Known Domain Algorithms
We will now state the well known Laplace [7] and Exponential [18] mechanisms. We present the
Laplace mechanism [7] in the context of histogram data with the assumption that the `∞-sensitivity
between any neighbors is bounded by τ . Note that we will use a slightly different scale of noise
in procedure KnownLap∆,τ in Algorithm 1 than is traditionally used. This is because we want to
compose bounded range algorithms in our privacy budget manager, where each algorithm has the
same parameter εper. We go into more detail of the privacy budget service in Section 6.
Algorithm 1 KnownLap∆,τ ; Laplace mechanism over known domain with `∞-sensitivity τ , and
∆-restricted sensitivity
Input: Histogram h, ∆ sensitivity, along with parameter εper.
Output: Noisy histogram.
for i ∈ [d] do
vi = hi + Lap(2τ/εper)
Return {v1, · · · , vd}
We now discuss the Exponential Mechanism [18] in full generality and use the range of a quality
score rather than the global sensitivity of the score, as was presented in [4].
Definition 5.1 (Exponential Mechanism). The Exponential Mechanism Mq : X → Y with qual-
ity score q : X × Y → R is written as Mq(x), which samples y with probability proportional to
exp
(
εperq(x, y)/Sq
)
where,
Sq := sup
x∼x′
{
max
y∈Y
{q(x, y)− q(x′, y)} − min
y′∈Y
{q(x, y′)− q(x′, y′)}
}
.
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Note that the Exponential Mechanism is equivalent to adding Gumbel noise Gumbel(∆q/εper)
to q(x, y) for each y ∈ Y and reporting the largest noisy counts [5]. We then have the following
result from [18, 4]
Lemma 5.1. The Exponential Mechanism is εper-BR qnd εper-DP.
In our case, the quality score will simply be the heights of the histogram. Note that we have
only discussed the Exponential Mechanism to return a single element. In the case where we want
to return k-elements, we can iteratively apply the Exponential Mechanism by removing the element
that is returned in each round and then run the Exponential Mechanism again without the previ-
ously returned elements, also known as peeling. However, we can implement this more efficiently
by adding Gumbel noise to all the counts and then releasing the top-k elements in a single shot [5].
However, we need to also include counts, so we add independent Laplace noise to the counts of the
elements in the noisy top-k. We then formally present the KnownGumbk,τ procedure in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 KnownGumbk,τ ; Exponential Mechanism over known domain with `∞-sensitivity τ
and unrestricted sensitivity
Input: Histogram h, number of outcomes k, and parameter εper.
Output: Ordered set of indices and counts.
for i ∈ [d] do
vi = hi + Gumbel(τ/εper)
Sort {vi} where vi1 ≥ · · · ≥ vid
Return
{
(i1, hi1 + Lap(2τ/εper)), ...., (ik, hik + Lap(2τ/εper))
}
We then have the following result which follows from Dwork et al. [7], as well as from McSherry
and Talwar [18], Dong et al. [4].
Lemma 5.2. Assume that ||h−h′||∞ ≤ τ and ||h−h′||0 ≤ ∆ for any neighbors h,h′. The procedure
KnownLap∆,τ is ∆εper/2-DP and ∆εper-BR. Further, if ∆ is large or unknown then KnownGumb
k,τ
is 3kεper/2-DP and 2kεper-BR.
5.2 Unknown Domain with ∆-Restricted Sensitivity
We present the UnkLap∆,d¯,τ procedure in Algorithm 3 in a more general form than in [5], which
only considered the distinct count case, i.e. τ = 1. Further, the proof of privacy remains true if we
release the counts as well as the indices. The proof of the following result follows a similar analysis
as presented in [5], which we present in Appendix A for completeness.
Lemma 5.3 (Durfee and Rogers [5]). Assume that ||h − h′||∞ ≤ τ and ||h − h′||0 ≤ ∆ for any
neighbors h,h′, then the procedure UnkLap∆,d¯,τ is (εper/2, δ)-DP.
5.3 Unknown Domain with Unrestricted Sensitivity
We present the UnkGumbk,d¯,τ procedure in Algorithm 4 in a more general form than in [5], which
only considered the distinct count case, i.e. τ = 1. The proof of the following theorem follows the
same analysis as in [5]. Note that we use the optimal threshold index procedure from Algorithm 6
in Durfee and Rogers [5] by default and return counts by adding Laplace noise to the discovered
elements in the top-k.
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Algorithm 3 UnkLap∆,d¯,τ ; Laplace mechanism over unknown domain with access to d¯ ≥ ∆ ele-
ments, `∞-sensitivity τ , and ∆-restricted sensitivity.
Input: Histogram h, ∆ sensitivity, cut off at d¯+ 1, and εper, δ.
Output: Ordered set of indices and counts.
Solve for δˆ: δ = δˆ/4 · (eεper/2 + 1)(3 + ln(∆/δˆ))
Sort h(1) ≥ h(2) ≥ · · · ≥ h(d¯+1).
Set v⊥ = h(d¯+1) + τ · (1 + 2∆ ln(∆/δˆ)/εper) + Lap(2τ∆/εper)
for i ≤ d¯ do
Set vi = h(i) + Lap(2τ∆/εper)
Sort {vi} ∪ v⊥
Let vi1 , ...., vij be the sorted list until v⊥
Return {(i1, vi1), ...., (ij , vij), (⊥, v⊥)}.
Theorem 1 (Durfee and Rogers [5]). Assume ||h − h′||∞ ≤ τ for any neighbors h,h′. Then
UnkGumbk,d¯,τ is ((2k + 1)εper, δ)-DP.
Algorithm 4 UnkGumbk,d¯,τ ; Exponential mechanism over unknown domain with access to d¯ ≥ k
elements, `∞-sensitivity τ , and unrestricted sensitivity
Input: Histogram h; outcomes k, cut off at d¯+ 1, and εper, δ.
Output: Ordered set of indices and counts.
Sort h(1) ≥ h(2) ≥ · · · ≥ h(d¯+1).
for i ∈ {k, · · · , d¯} do
Set vi = h(i+1) + τ + τ ln(i/δ)/εper + Gumbel(τ/εper)
Set k¯ = argmin{vi}.
Set h⊥ = h(k¯+1) + τ · (1 + ln(min{k¯, d¯− k¯}/δ)/εper).
Set v⊥ = h⊥ + Gumbel(τ/εper).
for j ≤ k¯ do
if h(j) > h(k¯+1) then
Set v(j) = h(j) + Gumbel(τ/εper).
Sort {v(j)} ∪ v⊥.
Let vi1 , ...., vij , v⊥ be the sorted list up until v⊥.
if j < k then
Return {(i1, hi1 + Lap(2τ/εper)), ..., (ij , hij + Lap(2τ/εper)),⊥}
else
Return {(i1, hi1 + Lap(2τ/εper)), ..., (ik, hik + Lap(2τ/εper))}.
6 Privacy Budget Management Service
We ultimately want to ensure that no analyst can identify any individual’s data with high confi-
dence. We then impose a strict overall (ε?, δ?)-DP guarantee. In order to compute the parameters
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(εper, δ) that we use in each call to our algorithms
1 over an entire sequence of interactions with the
API, we also want to know how many queries the API will allow, denoted as `? that we term the
call budget, which will effectively impact δ?. Further, we want to track the number of elements we
want to return, denoted as k? that we term the information budget, which will effectively impact
ε?. Note that k? does not necessarily equal the number of elements returned, because we might be
in the restricted sensitivity setting, and `? does not precisely equal the number of calls to the API,
since we might be in the known domain setting for some queries. Once we have (εper, δ), we will
only use these parameters in each algorithm, hence not allowing for adaptively changing privacy
parameters.
6.1 Budget Management Implementation
As mentioned in Section 4, the budget manager needs to be a distributed system so that it can
be accessed/updated from different application execution platforms. Each analyst may access data
from multiple data centers and each access must deduct from the same budget. Hence, the budget
manager maintains eventual consistency across data centers.
The budget can be thought of as an associative array with keys from [`, k] and values as the
corresponding units used. Given a particular outcome o from the API, the budget service will
update k? ← k?−∆ for ∆-restricted sensitivity queries or k? ← k?−2|o| for unrestricted sensitivity
queries where |o| denotes the number of elements returned in outcome o. Furthermore, the privacy
budget management system will update `? ← `? − 1 for each query the analyst makes that is in
the unknown domain setting. Once k? or `? are depleted, we prevent the analyst from making any
other queries. We address the challenge of computing the individual privacy parameters (εper, δ)
given (ε?, δ?, k?, `?) in Theorem 2.
We adopt a privacy budget management service that assumes any user does not collude with
other analysts. Hence each analyst is given her own privacy budget to interact with the Audience
Engagement API and her queries do not impact the budget of another analyst. One can imagine
variants of this assumption, such as all analysts that belong to the same company must share
a budget. Further, the API adheres to the privacy budget up to some time frame. Thus, if
an analyst has asked more than `? unknown domain queries, then she will not be allowed any
further queries. After this prescribed time frame, the parameters effectively get refreshed and the
analyst can continue asking queries. Refresh is acceptable at regular intervals if the underlying
data is flushed and replaced at similar intervals, whether through complete snapshot replacement,
or rolling windows, such that the user’s data does not remain constant.
The application links with a budget manager client library so as to hide the implementation
details of the budget management service because application writers do not need to know the
details about the budget database, or the budget refresh mechanisms. The parameters (k?, `?) may
be configured by the application.
6.2 Differential Privacy Composition
We present pseudocode for the privacy budget management service in Algorithm 5. We then present
a way to compute the privacy guarantee of our overall system, which largely follows the analysis
from Durfee and Rogers [5]. Essentially, the analysis follows from the fact that each algorithm can
be represented as an iterative sequence of εper-BR algorithms. Note that the algorithms in the
1Note that for the Laplace and Exponential mechanisms in the known domain, δ = 0.
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unknown domain setting have a probability δ of larger privacy loss, which we account for in the
overall δ? in the privacy guarantee.
Algorithm 5 BudgetSystemk
?,`? ; Budget Management Service
Input: An adaptive stream of histograms h1,h2, ...., fixed integers k
? and `?, along with per
iterate privacy parameters εper, δ.
Output: Sequence of outputs (o1, o2, · · · ).
while k? > 0 and `? > 0 do
From previous outcomes, select hi ∈ Ndi with `∞-bound τi.
Select ki and number of elements allowed to access d¯i
if histogram has ∆-restricted sensitivity then
if ∆ > k? then
Break
if d¯i > di then
oi = KnownLap
∆,τi(hi).
Update k? ← k? −∆.
else
oi = UnkLap
∆,d¯i,τi(hi)
Update `? ← `? − 1.
Update k? ← k? − 1.
if histogram has unrestricted sensitivity then
if 2ki > k
? then
Break
if d¯i > di then
oi = KnownGumb
ki,τi(hi).
Update k? ← k? − 2ki.
else
oi = UnkGumb
ki,d¯i,τi(hi)
Update `? ← `? − 1.
Update k? ← k? − (2|oi| − 1 {oi[−1] = ⊥}).
Return o = (o1, o2, · · · )
In order to allow for the budget management service to return counts in the unrestricted sensi-
tivity setting, we need to account for that in our overall budget. Further, in the unknown domain
setting, if the last element of oi is ⊥ at round i, denoted as oi[−1], then adding Laplace noise with
parameter 2τi/εper to the counts of each of the discovered |oi| − 1 elements. will ensure εper-BR
for each count. We can then apply our privacy loss bounds to get an overall DP guarantee by
updating k? ← k? − (2|oi| − 1) and when the last element in oi is not ⊥, then we instead update
k? ← k? − 2|oi|. Note that if we did not require counts in the results and need only return an
ordered list of elements in the top-k, then we need only update k? ← k? − |oi|.
Theorem 2. For δ′ ≥ 0 and εper, δ > 0, the BudgetSystemk?,`? is (ε?, δ?)-DP where δ? = 2`?δ+ δ′
and ε? is defined as the minimum between k?εper and the following,
k?
(
εper
1− eεper − 1− ln
(
εper
1− eεper
))
+ εper
√
k?
2
ln(1/δ′). (3)
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Proof. For the ∆-restricted sensitivity setting, we are deducting the information budget by ∆ in the
known domain setting or we scale the privacy parameter by ∆ and deduct one from the information
budget in the unknown domain setting. For a given histogram in the known domain setting, adding
Lap(2τ/εper) to each count will ensure ∆εper-BR. We can also analyze this mechanism as if we
iteratively add Lap(2τ/εper) to each count and then apply any DP or BR composition bound to
obtain a DP guarantee. We need only apply composition for the number of elements that can
actually change between neighboring datasets, i.e. ∆, and not the full dimension of the histogram.
For all settings, the application of each Laplace mechanism is εper/2-DP, hence εper-BR, while each
application of Gumbel noise (Exponential Mechanism) is εper-BR. Thus, we apply the composition
bounds for BR mechanisms from Dong et al. [4]. The resulting bound applies BR composition over
k? many εper-BR mechanisms and deducting 1 from the call cost budget `
? if an unknown domain
algorithm is used for a query.
Given the total budget for the number of outcomes and queries (k?, `?) along with privacy
budget (ε?, δ?) we can solve for the parameter εper that satisfies the budget, which is then used in
each algorithm. One approach we can use is the following (somewhat arbitrary) choice for δ = δ
?
4`?
and δ′ = δ?/2.
7 Results
We now present some preliminary results of our privacy system for the Audience Engagement API.
In Figure 3 we present curves for the number of discovered elements in a top-50 query with varying
εper and d¯, i.e. the number of elements to collect, in procedure UnkGumb
50,d¯,1 from Algorithm 4 with
a fixed δ = 10−10. The query is to find the top articles that distinct members from the San Francisco
area are engaging with. We provide intervals that contain the 25th and 75th percentiles over 1000
independent trials. Note that the randomness in each trial is solely from the noise generation and
we are using the same dataset each time. We see that with the same level of privacy, increasing the
number of elements to fetch allows us to discover more elements. Hence, we see a natural tradeoff
not just between privacy (εper) and utility (number of elements returned), but also between run
time (fetching more results) and utility. For example, we can return twice as many elements if we
fetch four times more elements with Pinot and setting εper = 0.8.
We also empirically evaluate procedure UnkLap∆,d¯,1 from Algorithm 3 in the unknown domain,
∆-restricted sensitivity setting. In Figure 4 we show both the proportion of times in 1000 trials
that each element was returned (right vertical axis) as well as the comparison between the noisy
counts (in green) and the true counts (in red) that are returned for the discovered elements for a
single trial (left vertical axis). In each plot there is a privacy parameter εper ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}, with
fixed δ = 10−10. The query is to find the top primary job titles of members that engaged with
articles about privacy or California. We assume that any one member cannot have more than one
primary job title, hence ∆ = 1, and fetch d¯ = 1000 results from Pinot.
For the budget manager, we have a fixed budget for each marketing partner. Once the privacy
budget is depleted, a marketing partner would recycle old queries to get the same results or wait
some fixed amount of time for the privacy budget to be refreshed. This policy decision for the
rate in which to refresh the budget is dependent on how often the underlying dataset gets renewed
and the characteristics of the underlying dataset. In order to maintain consistency across the same
queries on the same dataset, we use the same seed in the pseudorandom noise, as in [16].
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Figure 3: The number of discovered elements returned in UnkGumb50,d¯,1 for a top-50 query with
various d¯. We give the empirical average in 1000 trials and the (25%,75%) percentiles.
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Figure 4: The noisy counts (left y-axis) of the discovered elements returned in UnkLap1,1000,1 for a
top-100 query as well as the proportion (right y-axis) in which various elements in 1000 independent
trials were discovered.
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8 Conclusion
We have presented a privacy system that incorporates state of the art algorithms for releasing
histograms and top-k results in a differentially private way. Also, we have shown how we track the
privacy budget for multiple analysts that can query our API. Combining the budget management
service with DP algorithms allows us to make strong privacy guarantees of the overall system for
any external partner that is allowed to make multiple, adaptively selected queries. This privacy
system allows us to track the amount of information that is being released to external partners via
the API in a precise way so that we can make informed decisions in how we can balance privacy
safeguards with the usefulness of the product. We hope that this work demonstrates the feasibility
of providing rigorous DP guarantees in systems that can scale.
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A Omitted Analysis for Section 5.2
We now go through the analysis for Algorithm 3. The differences between Algorithm 3 and the
version that appeared as Algorithm 4 in [5] is that we are returning counts as well as indices, we
do not limit the number of outcomes to be at most k (since it is not a parameter), and we allow for
counts to increase or decrease by τ ≥ 1 in neighboring datasets. As we will mainly be borrowing
the analysis in [5] we will change d¯ to k¯ to better match the statements in that work. We then
introduce the following algorithm, which we will show has the same distribution as UnkLap∆,k¯,τ (h).
Definition A.1 (Limited Histogram Report Noisy Counts). We assume that the `∞ sensitivity
between any neighboring histograms is τ . We define the limited histogram report noisy counts to be
LapMaxk¯,τ that takes as input a histogram along with a domain set of indices and returns an ordered
list of counts with the corresponding index, where LapMaxk¯,τ (h,d) =
({v(1), i(1)}, ..., {v(⊥),⊥}) and
(v(1), ..., v(⊥)) is the sorted list of vi = h(i) + Lap(2τ∆/εper) for each i ∈ d and v⊥ = h(k¯+1) +
τ
(
1 + 2∆ ln(∆/δˆ)/εper
)
+ Lap(2τ∆/εper) with δˆ given in Algorithm 3 as a function of δ > 0.
We have the following that connects LapMaxk¯,τ with UnkLap∆,k¯,τ .
Corollary A.1. For any histogram h, we have that both mechanisms LapMaxk¯,τ (h,dk¯(h)) and
UnkLapk¯,τ (h) produce outcomes that are equal in distribution.
If we fix a domain d beforehand, then we have the following privacy statement. Note that
the privacy of LapMaxk¯,τ (h,d) follows from the Laplace mechanism [7] being εper-DP. This is what
allows us to output the counts as well as the indices. We just need to ensure that i(k¯+1) /∈ d
because then if it was, then changing one index would change the count of both h(k¯+1) and h⊥ =
h(k¯+1) + τ
(
1 + ∆ ln(∆/δ)/εper
)
.
Lemma A.1. For any fixed d ⊆ [d] and neighbors h,h′ such that i(k¯+1), i′(k¯+1) /∈ d, then for any
set of outcomes T ,
Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h,d) ∈ T ] ≤ eεper/2 Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h′,d) ∈ T ].
As was done in Durfee and Rogers [5], we can carefully account for the good (can bound the
privacy loss) and bad (can bound these events with small probability) sets. Note that the outcome
set of UnkLap∆,k¯,τ is a superset of Algorithm 4 in [5] when k = k¯, and it is straightforward to see
that these algorithms have the same distribution with respect to index output (ignoring the counts
output from UnkLap∆,k¯,τ ). Therefore, all the bounds on the bad outcomes will still hold for our
setting, and the analysis then follows from results in Section 6 of [5], where we state each result
here.
Definition A.2. Given two neighboring histograms h,h′, we define SLap as the outcome set of
UnkLap∆,k¯,τ (h,dk¯(h)) (both indices and counts) and the outcome set of UnkLap∆,k¯,τ (h′,dk¯(h′)) as
S ′Lap.
We then define the bad outcomes as SδLap := SLap \ S ′Lap and S ′δLap := S ′Lap \ SLap.
Lemma A.2. For ∆-restricted sensitivity neighbors h,h′, we have
Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h,dk¯(h)) ∈ SδLap] ≤ δ/4 · (3 + ln(∆/δ)) =: δ¯ (4)
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Lemma A.3. For any neighboring histograms h,h′ and for any S ⊆ SLap ∩ S ′Lap, we let dεper =
dk¯(h) ∩ dk¯(h′) and we must have the following for δ¯ given in (4)
Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h,dk¯(h)) ∈ S] ≤ Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h,dεper) ∈ S]
≤ Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h,dk¯(h)) ∈ S] + δ¯
Lemma A.4. For any neighboring histograms h,h′ and any S ⊆ SLap, then for δ¯ given in (4),
Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h,dk¯(h)) ∈ S]
≤ eεper/2 Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h′,dk¯(h′)) ∈ S] + (eεper/2 + 1)δ¯.
Proof. We use the above results to get the following inequalities.
Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h,dk¯(h)) ∈ S]
= Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h,dk¯(h)) ∈ S ∩ {SLap ∩ S ′Lap}]
+ Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h,dk¯(h)) ∈ S ∩ {SδLap}]
≤ Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h,dεper) ∈ S ∩ {SLap ∩ S ′Lap}] + δ¯
≤ eεper/2 Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h′,dεper) ∈ S ∩ {SLap ∩ S ′Lap}] + δ¯
≤ eεper/2
(
Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h′,dk¯(h′)) ∈ S ∩ {SLap ∩ S ′Lap}] + δ¯
)
+ δ¯
≤ eεper/2 Pr[LapMaxk¯,τ (h′,dk¯(h′)) ∈ S] + (eεper/2 + 1)δ¯.
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